高超音速的轰鸣( 四 )


国际战略研究院专家Douglas Barrie预计高超音速滑翔武器大约在2020年代的早期开始服役。这一结果可能会导致决策者的焦虑以及更加复杂的战场环境。保卫类似美洲大陆这样大面积领土的区域防御体系,主要针对击落处于中段的以及简单弹道的导弹。而滑翔武器飞行高度不高,弹道也难以预测,因此,普京总统宣扬“先锋”导弹是无法拦截的。(有说法认为,由于处于高温状态的滑翔式导弹在红外传感器上特征明显,部署在太空中的拦截武器能够对其进行攻击)
Point defences, which guard individual sites against shorter-range missiles, might have more luck. Gliders must slow down as they approach their targets. Systems like America’s THAAD have a proven ability to shoot down ballistic missiles, which close in more quickly.
而用于保卫单个目标不被短程导弹攻击的点防御体系,可能效果更好些。这是由于滑翔武器在接近目标时必须减速。像美国的THAAD系统,已经证明有能力击落快速接近的弹道导弹。
“The world has changed dramatically,” says Mr Bussing. “These systems are very, very difficult to counter and fundamentally give the holder a tremendous advantage over the states that don’t have them. The sense of urgency to develop ways to counter them is an imperative.”
“世界已经发生了戏剧性的变化”,Bussing说:“阻止(超高音速滑翔武器)难度非常大,与没有这些武器的国家相比,它从根本上带给持有国家以巨大优势。研发抵御方案迫在眉睫”
One American military official suggests that humans will have to hand ever more control to defences that are already semiautonomous: “There will be no time at all for a man in the loop.” The uncertain payload of gliders is another problem. If targets could not tell the difference between conventional and nuclear gliders, or feared that conventional ones, through accuracy and kinetic energy alone, could threaten important targets, they might choose to launch their own nuclear forces to avoid losing them.
一名美国军方官员指出:因为防御流程中没有给人类留下一点考虑时间。我们不得不给予现有的半自动防御系统更大的自主权。高超音速滑翔武器携带可变弹头是另一个问题。如果防御方不能分辨滑翔武器携带的是常规还是核弹头,或者担心高精度机动常规弹头会威胁到重要目标,那有可能会选择启用自己的核力量,以避免损失。
There are also wider implications for arms control. The impending collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (inf) Treaty, which barred America and Russia from possessing land-based missiles of 500km-5,500km ranges, clears the way for both countries to develop and deploy new ground-launched hypersonic missiles. A separate treaty, New start, caps the number of longer-range weapons, but is up for renewal in 2021 and looking shaky. When it was negotiated in 2010, America and
Russia implicitly agreed that gliders would not be covered. Former officials say that was a mistake.
这也会对军控造成广泛的影响。中程核武器条约限制美国和俄罗斯拥有射程在500千米到5500千米的陆基导弹。现在该条约处于岌岌可危的状态,为这两国研发和部署陆基高超音速导弹扫清了道路。覆盖远程武器数量的新《削减战略武器条约》也将在2021年到期,在2010年签署新条约时,美俄两国隐晦的表示高超音速滑翔武器不包含在条约之内。前官员认为这是一个失误。
Germany convened an arms-control conference in Berlin on March 15th to kick start a discussion on taming the risks posed by futuristic weapons, including hypersonic missiles, through diplomacy. Mr Maas called for an “international missiles dialogue” to discuss the challenge.
3月15日在德国柏林召开的军控会议呼吁尽快就通过外交手段化解包括高超音速武器等未来武器的威胁展开讨论。Mass先生呼吁建立国际导弹对话机制来应对这一挑战。
The UN’s disarmament office has proposed that rivals could swap information on test flights and take other confidence building measures. Corentin Brustlein of IFRI, a French think-tank, suggests capping glider numbers. Yet America and Russia are enmeshed in worsening disputes over today’s weapons, let alone tomorrow’s, and China shows little interest in tying its hands. Gliders are likely to enjoy a fair geopolitical wind.
高超音速的轰鸣】联合国裁军办公室提议竞争国家可能交换试验信息并采取其它建立互信的行动。法国智库IFRI的Corentin Brustlein 建议限制滑翔武器数量。然而美俄纠缠于越来越糟糕的现有武器分歧,更不用说将来的武器了。而中国对这一束缚兴趣寥寥。滑翔武器有可能因地缘政治环境而起。

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